Hard problem of consciousness reddit. You're shooting too high up the pyramid.

Hard problem of consciousness reddit Namely, the hard problem only exists if you’re committed to the notion that matter is the fundamental reality. Good qualia is good. 0 comments . Controversial. The hard problem of consciousness is not the the hard problem of consciousness, but the hard problem of materialism. I don't think science "proves" this. comments sorted by Best Top New Controversial Q&A Add a Comment [deleted] • Additional comment actions. The soft or "easy" part is how the brain might categorize and identify things, because this is seen has a method problem or a computational problem. If that is The meta problem of consciousness asks why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. An element of a culture or system of behavior that may be considered to be passed from one individual to another by nongenetic means, especially imitation. Again this is why it’s disappointing that AWARE didn’t record any visual targets, because that would’ve crushed such arguments too and led me to a very fulfilling spiritual journey. As you’ll see from the dates, most of the definitive work in this area is more than 20 years old. 04% accept or leaning toward consciousness being functional God: 66. So he brings up the Meta Hard Problem, which is basically whether or not you accept David Chalmers' Hard Problem of Consciousness. The connection between soft and hardware is in no way philosophically intractable. We may The failure is in the attempt to deacribe/define consciousness. The "hard problem" of consciousness solved. Do you have any idea how that might be done? Otherwise, I The author of this article seems not to understand what the hard problem of consciousness is; contrary to what they say, further discoveries in neuroscience cannot possibly lead to a solution. It's a fundamental contradiction between materialst assumption and our observations. , phenomenal consciousness, or mental states/events with phenomenal qualities or qualia). There seems to be an unbridgeable explanatory gap between the physical world and consciousness. This is only a “problem” for The mainstream interpretation in this observation problem is the Copenhagen interpretation, especially the epistemological modern Copenhagen interpretation, which considers the problem of consciousness separately from the problem of science. Chalmers presumably isn't claiming that there is only one hard problem tout court, but that this problem -- that consciousness cannot be explained by functional-mechanistic reductions -- is 'the' hard problem of consciousness. Old. But that leaves the question of why there is something it is like for the subject when these functions, This piece gives a quick, and not very good, statement of the hard problem, and doesn’t really do anything to show how it’s interestingly connected to language. It is analogous to the creationist assertion that random chemical mutations cannot be responsible (3) Hard problem of consciousness is the primarily the problem of deriving matters of phenomenal appearances from non-phenomenal non-qualitative functional processes. So that's just a personal, anecdotal conclusion but it does for me, so I'll stick with it. While one might argue that "given X mental (physiological) state, Y subjective experience is implied," there is still a failure i capturing exactly what Y is and how it comes to be. If you are rejecting we experience anything phenomenally at all , then ok. In short, how is mind and epiphenomena of matter. But it would be pointless, not least because having an advanced degree in mathemagics does not confer authority to speak about things like consciousness. It's an insufficient model to explain If by "hard problem of consciousness" you mean the problem of qualia, then I wouldn't say it has too much to do with existentialism. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. Treating any non-physical things, states, properties, and abstractions as real is a misconception. They ask how consciousness can come from matter because they are ASSUMING that matter isn't made of consciousness. The explanations given only serve to reveal The hard problem of consciousness isn't hard because it is difficult to explain, and it isn't a problem because it can't be explained. I have a number of anecdotal experiences that lead me to this belief. I've noticed a trend in discussion about consciousness in general, from podcasts, to books and here on this subreddit. If "we" (the inner eyes, the egos) truly don't exist outside of the experience that we do then we are just readers of the tape per say. Easy problems are easy because all that is required for their solution is to I think calling it "the hard problem" is actually a little loaded. This also doesn't seem accurate, the hard problem of consciousness is seemingly a problem for every Metaphysics of Mind position. It is the problem of explaining why there is “something it Philosopher David Chalmers on the combination problem, dualism, and panpsychism. This property can't be explained in terms of molecules alone. The "hard problem of consciousness" deals with how conscious experience can arise from unconscious matter. r/thehardproblem needs moderators and is currently available for request. " We expeene Claiming that consciousness is an illusion is uncompelling. optia MSc, psychology And it may well be telling us about consciousness in general, at a minimum its telling us a great deal about human consciousness. you can't know of consciousness without being conscious. It's the interaction between them that defines the aggregate state. Roger Penrose has a hypothesis involving some quantum physics effects occurring in the microtubules of neurons. David Chalmers (‘Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness’ []) focused the attention of people researching consciousness by drawing a distinction between the ‘easy’ problems of consciousness, and what he memorably dubbed the hard problem. " This is, specifically and importantly, backwards. . But when you realize everything is imaginary, everything is alive, everything is mind, then there is no more "hard problem of consciousness". Assuming we could analyze a living, conscious brain in real time, we would never be able to observe the color red, the View community ranking In the Top 5% of largest communities on Reddit. Thus, the hard problem of consciousness is not one of "how and why physical processes gave rise to consciousness," but the reverse: "how and why did consciousness give rise to physical processes. then we're still left with the hard problem: offering a satisfactory explanation of how Regardless of either Sapolsky's or Dennet's arguments about free will, the true mystery is the hard problem of consciousness. Comments are locked. Best. (If I'm even close to comprehending this essay, consciousness is what OP would designate "redundant We're neither dualists nor materialists so it's not really a problem for us, we believe that humans are simultaneously material and immaterial and that these interpenetrate each other and aren't opposed or even entirely separate realities. Not that I necessarily believe in the distinction between hard and soft problems of consciousness. If you wish to learn more, or to apply to become a panelist, It's just that, when applied to consciousness, it breaks down like teenage girl at a one direction concert. I'm with Dan Dennett on this, the "hard" problem goes away once the "easy" problems of consciousness are solved. Admitting that there is a paradox inherent in our the pseudo-materialist, ‘common sense’ understanding of consciousness The hard problem, on the other hand, does not seek to explain material processes and so cannot be solved like that (only the easy problem can). Phrasing such a hypothesis, and figuring out whether the hypothesis actually tests what consciousness is may be a task where both he "Hard Problem of Consciousness," as formulated by philosopher David Chalmers, poses a fundamental question: Why and how does physical matter produce subjective experiences, like the redness of red or the feeling of love? This problem has stumped neuroscientists, philosophers, and psychologists alike. If we think of functionalism in a non-reductive sense, i. The problem is that physicalism Most duck the hard problem, either bracketing it until neuroscientists explain brain function more fully or accepting that consciousness has no deeper explanation and must be wired into the base level of reality. How can inanimate dust become conscious? How can it experience anything at all? Why isn't it all just a black void. org Open. Many don't actually seem to understand that what you are talking about is subjective experience. What is consciousness? Who cares? It's like free will. Modern theories of consciousness have actually come a long way, you just don’t know where to look for that information. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. Consciousness is said to be a hard problem. The difficulty for the scientific community to put the experience of senses (qualia), and the existence of consciousness, into a valid scientific physical system. The hard problem of consciousness, as I understand it, is that we can’t explain, for example, how a given wavelength hitting the rods and cones of our eyes to create action potentials interacting with our neurones creates the feeling of redness. But I think the opposite is also interesting: Why are there people who completely reject that there is any problem? To me, for example, the explanatory gap is clear. Next Dennett gives his talk, trying to show that there is no genuine "hard problem" at all in the first place because there's no second transduction or Cartesian There's really two problems with the hard problem of consciousness and the first, which is what I believe you're getting at here, is an epistemology question that's applicable to all science. ' So for example, we can explain that the ability to discriminate between 2 We could also get bogged down in whether or not the "asking" of the appropriate questions, such as the hard problem of consciousness, should concern us, if we consider this irrespective of other aspects of the system, such as its physical or functional make up - such that we might come up with a case where Siri poses the hard problem to us but From what I understand, the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" arises from the difficulty in reconciling physicalism with the phenomenal qualities of our experience. I think it will be Memes! A way of describing cultural information being shared. CMV The hard problem of consciousness isn’t that hard . Even if "the hard problem" is solved it wont make much difference to me. Consciousness is actually just retrieving memories (of being consciousness. A maybe more interesting note: the way the word "self-consciousness" is constructed (and not This indicates that a physical explanation of consciousness is fundamentally incomplete: it leaves out what it is like to be the subject, for the subject. There must be a way to keep questions pertaining to the existence of qualia from shifting into questions pertaining to the existence From what I understand, the so-called "hard problem of consciousness" arises from the difficulty in reconciling physicalism with the phenomenal qualities of our experience. Galen Strawson, Explaining why consciousness occurs at all can be contrasted with so-called “easy problems” of consciousness: the problems of explaining the function, dynamics, and structure of consciousness. The hard problem is just another reason why materialism doesn't work. , these are mere subsets of The "Hard Problem of Consciousness" is that consciousness is real and functional, and all efforts to explain this under physicalism have failed. Hot New Top Rising. The hard problem is explaining why There is no hard problem. I wrote a blog post explaining it - here - and would love if you gave it a read and let me know what you think. How do you define knowledge? If you define knowledge as truth, the hard problem of consciousness becomes nearly impossible because you can know very few David Chalmers is the leading “hard problem” philosopher, and much of his work is online. It's jarring and weird and not something that can be blithely dismissed. Q&A. In fact there is strong People who put forward the hard problem of conscioussness do not believe that consciousness is not generated by brain activity, they simply believe consciousness, though entirely caused by brain activity, isn't identical to the brain, and depending on the philosopher, is made of a different stuff than the brain, or is a property of the physical You seem hostile to the idea of the hard problem and I’m not here to debate it. If you define consciousness through things we can observe, then the hard problem immediately goes away. So, in good scientific tradition, i start to doubt that the model The hard problem is a specific argument based on the conceivability of p-zombies. The vast majority of philosophers (or at least analytic philosophers) subscribe to some sort of property dualism, and believe that consciousness, qualia and so forth can never be reduced to material interactions alone, there must be something else there. Please read our rules before commenting and understand that your comments will be removed if they are not up to standard or otherwise break the rules. If you have something to teach others post here. If consciousness is identical to functional states then you reduce conscious states to functional states. It's not about we can't talk about consciousness or experience consciousness or describe consciousness at certain level. The hard problem of consciousness is understanding what it is and I think this explains that. " It is impossible. But you did, as your consciousness was completely destroyed in the process. May as well. It is analogous to the creationist assertion that random chemical mutations cannot be responsible Another 'you' would appear, who would not think they had died. Why did sentience/consciousness evolve when it does not serve a true purpose? Could you explain how does Daniel Dennett solve (or attempt to solve) the hard problem of consciousness ? Maybe an example of how he thinks about it would be enough, but after watching several interviews on this specific topic, I'm still unsure what he means. There is no hard problem of dancing or hard problem of consciousness. Question- Debate Allowed Is there any new research that can account for consciousness? I haven’t seen any major breakthroughs. These two formulae describe the neurobiological definition of consciousness or beingness or qualia, which is/are not what the hard problem actually is. The official Python community for Reddit! Stay up to date with the latest news, packages, and meta information relating to the Python programming language. And I don't think they claim to have solved the hard problem, but rather imply that the 'hard problem' doesn't really exist in the first place. Atheism is built on the premise that all things can be explained physically—that everything ultimately boils down to a material world. The hard problem of consciousness refers to the gap of understanding the strong emergence of consciousness. The ‘hard problem’ is not an empirical fact but the salient result of internal contradictions in a logico-conceptual schema; Because matter cannot be used to create immaterial things. , etc. In Science there's no hard problem of consciousness: consciousness is just a result of our neural activity, we may discuss whether there's a threshold to meet, or whether emergence plays a role, but we have no evidence that there is a problem at all: if AI shows the same sentience of a human being then it is de facto sentient. The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the The problem is divided into a hard and soft problem. It does "solve" the hard problem, but like most other responses have its own set of problems in return. But who knows. 2. As I understand it the hard problem of consciousness is basically asking how our rich, fully realised subjective view of the world can emerge from physical matter. Note that the hard problem is not that we cannot have scientific explanations of consciousness because it can't be observed. And criticisms of it seem to me as if they are missing the point. Sort by: Best. Metaphysical dualism is a "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. While we do not require citations in answers (but do encourage them), answers need to be reasonably substantive and well-researched, accurately portray the state of the research, and come only The degree of consciousness (Φ) is proportional to the system's quantum integrated information. 42% accept or lean towards there being a hard problem of consciousness Zombies: 36. How the brain takes information from a bunch of sensory modalities and turns it He then spells out the different kinds of philosophical and scientific views one can have regarding consciousness, as well as the difficulties which arise for each type of view. The hard problem asks "how are we conscious if all the basic energy and matter out of which we are formed is all non-conscious?" This question is based on the false assumption that basic energy and particles are devoid of consciousness. It is simply inconceivable how matter could become conscious. It is a part of a shared network called the universe and each consciousness is able to interact with it The problem of “experience itself” is the “hard problem of consciousness”. This ties into ethics and what not if you believe every individual consciousness had infinite value and thereforw you can not use them as ”means to an end because they are ends in and of themselves. Many neuroscientists reject the term “hard problem” by the way. And if anyone here The straightforward solution to the hard problem of consciousness for materialists like myself - agreeing mostly with Dennett - is that there is "obviously" no hard problem of consciousness. The hard problem of consciousness is the more sophisticated modern version of dualism - that there is something spiritual or non-material about our mind or In my view, the hard problem is a very reasonable dilemma for philosophy, cog. Open comment sort options. The so called hard problem only happens because people reject this understanding for psychological reasons and once you reject the truth, yeah things are gunna get hard to View community ranking In the Top 5% of largest communities on Reddit. No, I'm just correcting a misunderstanding you have about the issue. There is no The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why any physical state is conscious rather than nonconscious. But when I realized that everything is imaginary, everything is alive, everything is mind, then there was no more "hard problem of As a prospective solution to the hard problem, surely it has the same problem that old-school identity theory or behaviorism or anything like this does--why does some threshold of information integration produce consciousness? I. pinned by moderators. The problem of consciousness is to determine what it is. The physicalist view (which I suspect is quite common among atheists) is that consciousness is a byproduct of complex networks of neuron patterns. can be explained in terms of The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i. Please note that as of July 1 2023, given recent changes to reddit's platform which make moderation significantly more difficult, r/askphilosophy has moved to only allowing answers and follow-up questions by panelists. Bad qualia is bad. I lean towards physicalism but I think there is a hard problem of consciousness that presents a problem I also think a lot of people on reddit don't understand what the hard problem is Furthermore, I don't think people realize that some Had this thought today on consciousness, let me know if you think it makes sense. Hard Problem of Consciousness: Irreducible Mind (Part 2) by InspiringPhilosophy. For all we know, everything we think we know is known only by the finite limitations of a subjective mind-body complex. The hard problem of consciousness comes from a similar place. This is called the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness, something heavily debated among philosophers and neuroscientists However, this video breaks down why there isn't a 'hard problem' to begin with and why that is. Which of course they seem to have met--since answering the various "easy problems" leaves the question of the "hard problem" unanswered, which is just to say that there is the hard problem. And it is the subjective experience that provides the space for goals and Chalmers made the distinction between Hard and Easy problems famous, and the exact distinction can seem pretty murky at times. 1. And about the hard problem he writes the following: The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. The 'informatic pattern required for you to be conscious' is a predicate for our understanding of conscious experience. But in general, the idea is that, while "Easy" problems aren't actually easy, answering them will require a kind of explanation in terms that we already understand. All of us know for certain at least The question of what is consciousness, when someone/something is concious and how we can know is the philosophical question. Routine objection: the hard problem of consciousness cannot be solved by reducing consciousness to some computational dynamics without a convincing answer to the question "will a very simple computer model with the same dynamics have consciousness, why or why not". Your consciousness is part of a larger network of consciousness. Posted by 4 years ago. This subjective aspect is You're shooting too high up the pyramid. I don’t really see why this is such a head scratcher- our bodies come equipped with all of the I'm also not aware of any progress having been made on the hard problem, the so-called easy problem though is being chipped away at at a rather quick rate. Today. In the physicalist picture of the mind, we simply identify our experience with certain brain states what more is there The "hard problem" doesn't exactly falsify anything, but other parts of science have killed physicalism and some scientists are not taking the hint. What could be MORE important than consciousness? It's the only thing that we as individuals have It is sometimes suggested that we can avoid, solve, or dissolve, the "hard problem" by retreating to some form of idealism. note: Rejecting P1 or P2 (Eliminativism and Idealistic Solipsism respectively) are logically possible ways to dissolve the hard problem entirely. I’m skeptical of everything that comes my way, but it would change my life if I were to find out Welcome to r/askphilosophy. Edit: Is this your argument? 1. Hard Problem: 62. comments sorted by Best Top New Controversial Q&A Add a Comment. This could be interesting, and is a topic worthy of The degree of consciousness (Φ) is proportional to the system's quantum integrated information. It is a hard problem because it is the thing doing the explaining, and it needs no explanation. When we see, for example, we experience The hard problem is the axiomatic assumption that experience cannot be encoded into the physical world and that there must be some other aspect transcendent beyond physical reality to explain consciousness, though there is no scientific evidence or justification for this assertion. The Hard Problem of consciousness arises only because we normally make a plausible metaphysical assumption. Consciousness is a hard problem, one that a host of philosophers, neuroscientists, computer scientists, cognition scientists, physicians, psychologists and other science practitioners have As a prospective solution to the hard problem, surely it has the same problem that old-school identity theory or behaviorism or anything like this does--why does some threshold of information integration produce consciousness? I. If you aren't rejecting the very existence of phenomenal experience, the problem still remains. The hard problem is called the hard problem, not because it's, like kinda hard. Prima Facie, There would be no ‘hard problem’ if one did not conflate explanatory abstractions with concrete ontological primitives; if one did not attempt to paradoxically reduce mind to abstractions of mind. Adopting idealism, neutral monism View community ranking In the Top 1% of largest communities on Reddit. The hard problem isn't interesting to me for this reason, it attempts to collapse to a single unexplained and unclear concept, consciousness, a problem that requires the distinction between explicit and inexplicit thoughts, since the differences between these 2 is where "experience" emerges from, the fact we can talk about and reason about only Though I think in both cases they are best understood as responding to the hard problem. 95% accept or leaning toward atheism "The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. Consciousness, however, suggests that this isnt the case In its simplest form, the Hard Problem of Chalmers claims that no physical explanation can truly explain consciousness, so it's frustrating to try and address his Hard Problem because he assumes from the outset that any physicalist attempt at an answer won't really be an answer. I would like some help to once and for all, succinctly and concisely, understand Chalmers' position on Zombies and the Hard Problem. The hard problem is exactly what was destroyed but not rebuilt on the other side. Anything Welcome to r/askphilosophy. I think you have misunderstood the hard problem of conciousness. The problem is that we have The hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers 1995) is the problem of explaining the relationship between physical phenomena, such as brain processes, and experience (i. He argues that these experiences can The hard problem is a symptom of incorrect ontological assumptions. Yes, Virginia, rocks have I’m struggling to figure out what you think the loophole is. An existence unconscious of itself? Well it must be an emergent property of this inanimate dust. Rising. It's not clear how getting more specific in determining the precise class would satisfy the hard problem proponents. And, of course, he meant "hard problem" ironically, because what he described was not a 'difficult task', but an impossibility by definition. On the And finally, the hard problem is not a problem "for philosophy". When we see, for example, we experience From Wikipedia: The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualitative phenomenal experiences. If the consciousness assumption is correct, then to me therein lies the source of potential disaster. Share Sort by: Best. This is in contrast to the "easy problems" of explaining the physical systems that give humans and other animals the ability to discriminate, integrate information, and so forth. Assuming we could analyze a living, conscious brain in real time, we would never be able to observe the color red, the The physicalist/idealist dichotomy and insistence that this fight be centered around the so-called “hard problem” of consciousness is unfruitful and is not where the issues lie. " This problem dissolves once the materialist paradigm is discarded and the superior idealist paradigm is adopted, in which consciousness is primary. The brain is categorically a computer, consciousness software. It would almost seem we need something that goes beyond the natural laws of the universe to account for this strange dilemma. Qualia may just be another phenomena of nature that happens just like gravity. The hard problem points out that consciousness is by all appearances an immaterial phenomenon, or one with immaterial properties, and thus materialism is incapable of accounting for it. All we have are CORRELATES of consciousness. I was under the impression that the “hard problem” of consciousness is simply how does insentient matter and insentient processes give rise to sentient consciousness. The article never proved the hard problem is a distraction from the "real problem" because it never defined how the constituents of the real problem are any different than those of the hard problem. He can largely thank his PhD advisor Douglass Hofstadter There are FIVE hard problems of consciousness: The hard problem: everyone knows this Thermostats do not have these kinds of conversations on reddit. In other words, it isn't a hard problem for science, it is a hard problem for engineering, regardless of how advanced and complete any science that engineering is based on could be. Aside from experiences in my own life, the phenomenon of self The Hard Problem poses a challenge for sciencistic and physicalist accounts of consciousness, since both insist on only appealing to the resources of scientific materialism. For instance, no matter how long we analyze the physical brain, we will never find objective evidence of subjective experience/qualia. It is known The hard problem of metaphysics: figuring out if other phenomena exist in our universe that like consciousness require we bear a specific metaphysical relation to them - i. The hard question is not the hard problem. If you think it's possible, then quite The hard problem is the axiomatic assumption that experience cannot be encoded into the physical world and that there must be some other aspect transcendent beyond physical reality to explain consciousness, though there is no scientific evidence or justification for this assertion. A: The hard problem of consciousness, according to Chalmers and the majority of philosophers that use this term, is the problem of how and why there is conscious experience Thomas Nagel’s perspective on the hard problem of consciousness revolves around the subjective nature of conscious experiences. Debate The Hard Problem of Consciousness is only hard within the context of materialism. The Hard Problem, as defined by philosopher David Chalmers, refers to the difficulty in explaining how and why we have subjective phenomenal experiences, also The very last chapter is dedicated to problems of consciousness. I don't think there's a problem in the first place. , this is the same question we're left with in the face of all these theories--why does the activity of certain 1. If one takes the hard problem seriously, then one must admit that we The hard problem of consciousness: Why did human beings evolve to be sentient? From an evolutionary standpoint, it would have been more efficient to evolve as organic computers; responding to input with output. Welcome to thehardproblem. Science can solve the great mystery of consciousness – how physical matter gives rise to conscious experience – we just When Chomsky says the question of how that which is inaccessible to consciousness becomes conscious is a harder problem, it makes me wonder whether me or him are misunderstanding the hard problem. Indeed in a way View community ranking In the Top 5% of largest communities on Reddit. That is an illusory gap that results from bad ways of describing a physical system, and disappears if you describe a system in terms of behaviors. Then it gestures at moving away from a materialist conception of the world to a more moral or even religious conception. In the physicalist picture of the mind, we simply identify our experience with certain brain states what more is there Posted by u/dango_alife - 8 votes and 35 comments The Dreaming God Theory - To solve the hard problem of consciousness we must remain open to the fact that human perception is limited by sensory experience. From what Wikipedia tells me, David Chalmers introduced the term 'hard problem' to describe the issue with explaining consciousness. Not only is this sentence barely grammatical but that's not what the hard problem of consciousness is. It is not "difficult. " In this case, I think the problem is soluble. Now, I take physicalism to be the view that there is an external world made of matter which obeys some observable laws, and furthermore this "external" world is "all there is". If it wasn’t Roger Penrose I would probably dismiss it as crackpottery, but it’s Roger Penrose. The problem has to do with the limits of reductive explanations-- in particular, functional explanations. However, I've noticed from listening to the reactions of Sam's guests, to people on other podcasts, and from personally trying to explain it to people, that most people are apparently incapable of understanding that the hard problem of consciousness is a real problem. If everything is in some sense mental, then there's no special problem about how mentality arises in the world from non-mental items. [1] David Chalmers[2] contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, focus attention, etc. The material model of neurobiology is generally sufficient as they continue their progress on understanding the components of human cognition. The way I see it, hard problem of consciousness seems hard and mysterious because we are making a self-referential analysis (humans on humans). The mathematical machinery of quantum field theory describes fields of insentience. One good expression of this by Dennett was at Toward a science of consciousness (conference), Tucson, Arizona, 2014 April 21-26 [Link to Dennett's talk]. New. The hard problem of consciousness will have been dissolved (just like the hard problem of life was dissolved). Get rid of materialism and nobody is talking about the hard problem any more. It is an area of active research and a very deep topic. Debate Thus, the hard problem of consciousness is not one of "how and why physical processes gave rise to consciousness," but the reverse: "how and why did consciousness give rise to physical processes. I get tired of the parts where he talks about perception/appearances in consciousness because that's the contents of consciousness and that is a different topic to the But the hard problem of consciousness focuses on what is special about a sentient being to be aware. The problem with materialist approaches to the hard problem is that they always end up avoiding the issue by redefining what we mean by ‘consciousness’. Some metaphors people use when trying to hone in on the phenomena is to say that it's the "movie in your head" (Chalmers), that inner life that you have, or more comically that it's the annoying thing that occurs between naps (also Chalmers). If you have questions or are new to Python use r/learnpython The more I dig into the idea of no free will and that we are essentially just observers of what is happening in and around and to us, not actors in it the easier the hard problem seems. It is purely a problem for materialism. Why are physical processes ever accompanied by experience? And why does a given physical We could also get bogged down in whether or not the "asking" of the appropriate questions, such as the hard problem of consciousness, should concern us, if we consider this irrespective of other aspects of the system, such as its physical or functional make up - such that we might come up with a case where Siri poses the hard problem to us but Their point isn't exactly that, but that consciousness is simply a delusion that arose because it's evolutionary beneficial to social species. Many believe that the “hard problem” is basically a really difficult empirical problem that science will eventually solve; that solutions to so-called “easy problems” of consciousness will amount to a solution to the “hard problem”. As an analogy, try taking a transparent jar of legos and shaking them. Explaining information processing is just the easy problem of consciousness (the contents of consciousness) and explaining the phenomenal nature of experience is the hard problem. The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences — how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colours and tastes. The “ Hard Problem of Consciousness ” is the problem of how physical David Chalmers (‘Facing up to the hard problem of consciousness’ ) focused the attention of people researching consciousness by drawing a distinction between the ‘easy’ The "hard" problem of consciousness, which not everyone agrees is even a problem, is how subjective experience in the form of qualia, intentionality, etc. I'd really recommend Consciousness and the Brain for info on the neural correlates of consciousness approach. Agreed. Given that the scientific method address questions from a quantitative perspective, it isn't clear that science directly answers qualitative questions about the subjective features of perception. We have a hard problem with consciousness because we fail to recognize that consciousness does not ‘emerge’; it is immanent to all matter and energy. All these And therefore there is no hard problem of consciousness, the burden of proof is first on the one proposing the hard problem that there actually is a hard problem. Add a Comment Regardless of either Sapolsky's or Dennet's arguments about free will, the true mystery is the hard problem of consciousness. What we do is arbitrarily categorize patterns of our experiences into polarities, up/down, inside/outside, black/white when they are really one The Hard Problem of Consciousness: a question that will forever change the way you see reality, and a strong argument against atheism. Created Apr 7, There's really two problems with the hard problem of consciousness and the first, which is what I believe you're getting at here, is an epistemology question that's applicable to all science. Consciousness encompasses a wide variety of cognitive functions. I remember his interview with Sam from 2016. Perhaps we will find out that the hard-problem is nonsense, but to deny the existence of our own consciousness would be very weird Then again, not long ago to deny the existence of the The truth is that formulating the hard problem as a question misrepresents what makes it the Hard Problem. The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. The tl;dr is that nothing exists besides the relations between things, that all things that are exist as structures of relationships, and that Posted by u/Tritium-12 - 41 votes and 35 comments The Hard Problem of Consciousness is the question of how non-conscious substances can, when together, produce consciousness. Mind The hard problem of consciousness is already beginning to dissolve. card classic compact. card. Hegel would say this is a misunderstanding: both the non The hard problem of consciousness is only a problem if you assume (and it is an assumption) that there is any distinction at all between a hypothetical immaterial mind and a hypothetical mind independent reality. Dennet has written many books and papers on consciousness if you're interested on Some people think there isn't a hard problem because they hold to some sophisticated view that dissolves the hard problem. These problems are seen as relatively Hard Problem of Consciousness . experiments are groundwork here). And this is a practical problem as well, if you have The hard problem of discussing consciousness is the fact that a lot of people don't understand what Chalmers proposed, and you end up restating the hard problem 40 times to someone to try to have a discussion on common footing. Because words are not a tool we invent because we have consciousness, they are an innate part of consciousness, if not the very cause of consciousness. The theory also immediately solves the hard problem of consciousness. It actually reinforced the hardness of the hard problem by admitting the unknowns (which is further than, say, Dennett has gone). David Chalmers, who introduced the term "hard problem" of consciousness, contrasts this with the "easy problems" of explaining the ability to discriminate The hard problem of consciousness is essentially one of trying to understand what exactly consciousness is. The way I understand the hard problem from Chalmers paper seems at odds with how most people understand the hard Another 'you' would appear, who would not think they had died. But we know that it’s a neat trick your brain plays the "easy" problems: -everything we could answer with neuroscience psychology including all of our behaviour: you did this because of neurons atoms quarks -how the brain processes/computes information bonus: the meta problem of consciousness: -why do we think there is a hard problem of consciousness? -it is part of the easy problems For me, hard problem of consciousness seems like wondering how can water be liquid by looking only at the individual molecules of water. Consciousness is a hard problem, one that a host of philosophers, neuroscientists, computer scientists, cognition scientists, physicians, psychologists and other science practitioners have It varies from consciousness to conciousness to consciousness but there is good and bad qualia. It is closely related to the mind-body problem. What gives rise to that, whatever that is, may be an answer for science, if it can form a testable hypothesis for it. That's the whole point of the thought experiment. But nobody talks about the hard problem of abiogeneis, or the hard problem of intermediate black holes, or the hard problem quantum mechanics, or the hard problem of p or np. Compare the Hard Problem with Zeno's paradox that motion is apparently impossible. OTOH, keep trying to make materialism work and P4. The problem is created only in conceptualizing a distinction between matter and consciousness. People either see the problem or they don’t, and for people who see the problem the past 20 years haven’t really changed anything. In reality, none exists. It is basically the reaction of one piece of ‘reality’ to another, and the more complex the matter, the more complex the reactions. Hot New Top. e. However, in recent years, a minority of researchers (e. The idea seems to be the our atoms are not self aware so how can subjectivity come from them. But they're like, textbook example of atheists who are so absolutely scared of religion that they lash out at anything they think is vaguely associated with it. For example, when we observe much more simple organisms (e. amoeba, worms, insects, other mammals), then the mystic characteristics of consciousness kind of goes away. I think you slightly misunderstand the point regarding the hard problem of consciousness. A maybe more interesting note: the way the word "self-consciousness" is constructed (and not Claiming that consciousness is an illusion is uncompelling. Retrieving memories was I realize that physicalists usually reject the conceivability of p-zombies—a hypothetical being that has all the biology and physics of humans, but which do not experience qualia. It doesn't matter. You can see the "hard" problem elaborated vs. The problem isn't how our mind is structured with things like self or memory etc. NDE-ModTeam • This sub is an NDE-positive sub. ” Or if But, here is my take: Chalmer's hard problem is irrelevant to materialism. The hard problem of consciousness asks why and how humans have qualia or phenomenal experiences. The p-zombie thought experiment is not an argument - it's a thought experiment that results from the Hard Problem of Consciousness. How can it be fundamental, and yet stop happening when we are in deep sleep, or There is no hard problem of consciousness. It seems like brain and mind are two entirely different things. We can put what makes the "hard problem" hard in argument form: If an answer to the question "What is conscious experience?" Thinking about this i think goes to the core of the hard problem. It's not aimed at the hard problem of consciousness but very good at probing the boundaries our everyday notions of consciousness reflected in things like "she wasn't conscious, she was asleep" or "he wasn't conscious of the man sneaking up behind him. I'm personally a panexperientialist; I believe that experience occurs in all the relations between instances of being - that is, everything from a grain of sand to an entire galaxy can feel or experience things. The meta problem of consciousness asks why there seems to be a hard problem of consciousness. How do you define knowledge? If you define knowledge as truth, the hard problem of consciousness becomes nearly impossible because you can know very few I would assert that human consciousness is at least as difficult as the Halting Problem This is nonsense. Another example might be how can atoms (non-life) be constituents of life. share. In my mind the only alternatives are Integrated Information theory, David Pearces theory of consciousness, the orch or theory, neutral monism, Galen Strawsons Panpsychism, thomistic dualism, The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. I'll do you one better, and say that it doesn't exist. So a rock is conscious just like a virus, but it is comparatively not alive I have seen this happen over and over when the "hard problem of consciousness" has been discussed in public fora: with many people, it's hard to even get the discussion going. but the flaw in this is the definition of consciousness However, if we find out some very specific and particular kind of informational/computational subprocess within such processes, and we develop a working In the Phil Papers survey, there was a question: >Hard problem of consciousness (is there one?): >Yes: 62% >No: 30% Does that mean some people (Quick definition for those who haven't heard of it - the 'hard problem of consciousness' is the scientific/philosophical problem of why and how The Hard Problem's existence is controversial and has not been demonstrated. Color and our other sensations are not material properties, they exist as completely immaterial phenomena, solely in our minds. It is not an empirical problem for Hard problem of consciousness. There is a Hard Problem of Consciousness. Do you think that if the legos were shaken over a period of 13 billion years they would become conscious? That's absurd. That is, even if some of these It’s only a hard problem if you assume human consciousness is qualitatively different than animal consciousness and not just a difference of complexity. An 'easy problems' are those where 'all that is required for their solution is to specify a mechanism that can perform the function. Charmers distinguishes between the hard problem of cocniousness and the softer problems of conciousness, and argues that whilst physicalism can adequately answer the softer problems, such as how the brain stores memories or processes sensory information, it fails to provide an answer to the hard problem. In science, you use your senses and mechanical devices to gather and analyze information about the world outside of you. TIL of the hard problem of consciousness. The intrinsic nature of the physical, the mysterious “fire" in the equations, is non-experiential. It is not The hard problem of consciousness is not about the difference between conscious and unconscious brain activity, but why there should be any conscious brain activity at all. This is called the "hard problem of consciousness. en. If there is no duality of matter and consciousness, that also approves the conviction of a materialist believing in physical processes of brain. One wonders why this talk of 'hard problems' is anything more than a rhetorical justification for lapses in understanding. Human beings do not see "red," do not feel "heat," and do not taste "sweet. About Community. And it certainly undermines the brain in the vat and similar thought experiments, since it shows us that you need more than just a brain in that vat to get conscious experience- you need not only a brain in the vat, but a body (and a physical If you want to hear from the other side, David Chalmers is a notable philosopher (I believe he may have coined the term “hard problem of consciousness”). While the majority of Philosophers of the Mind tend towards acceptance of the Hard Problem, the numbers are In the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experience. TED Talk by David Chalmers, man who coined the "hard problem" of consciousness. They start off by declaring that they are going to solve the hard problem, to explain experience; but somewhere along the way they start using the word ‘consciousness’ to refer not to experience but to some complex behavioural the "easy" problems: -everything we could answer with neuroscience psychology including all of our behaviour: you did this because of neurons atoms quarks -how the brain processes/computes information bonus: the meta problem of consciousness: -why do we think there is a hard problem of consciousness? -it is part of the easy problems I don't see any reason why the "easy" problems (which are really hard) aren't the solution to the "hard" problem of consciousness. Ultimately the whole discussion of the Hard Problem of Consciousness doesn't often consult in any depth anyone before around the 17th century so Agree 100%. The Dreaming God Theory - To solve the hard problem of consciousness we must remain open to the fact that human perception is limited by sensory experience. We don't typically feel the need to demand exact explanations for why the speed of light is 299,792,458 m/s or why two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom make a water The hard problem of consciousness refers to the gap of understanding the strong emergence of consciousness. Most people already think that consciousness is caused by a particular class -- neural states or functional equivalents (if you are a functionalist). The problem is that we cannot distinguish between physical systems that are conscious and those that are not. Because we don't have any substantial way to articulate a solution to the hard problem, we won't have any way to know what the subjective experience of this system is. That said, I don't think an answer to the "hard problem" is going to come in the form of a single experiment, or a great new idea from a philosopher. , this is the same question we're left with in the face of all these theories--why does the activity of certain The hard problem of consciousness is, in a nutshell, the question of defining and explaining the nature of the subjective experience ("qualia") that we conscious beings are subject to. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of Well, first, let's get clear on what the "hard problem," as articulated by David Chalmers, is. Rationalwiki is a bit of a guilty pleasure for me, I like it when they make fun of transhumanist concepts like mind uploading and stuff. We may Against there being a hard problem of consciousness the strongest opposition probably comes from arch nemesis Daniel Dennett. Others understand it but deny that there is any problem in explaining it. Less Sam Harris and more Keith Frankish. While the Hard Problem is often constructed to refer to Phenomenal Experience, Qualia, etc. (I side with Chalmers however). sci. We think and act like it exists so what does it matter if it Consciousness is wholly distinct and independent from information processing mentioned above. The possibility of consciousness isn’t in question at all. I think if consciousness turns out to be fundamental, the distinction between what we today define as "alive" vs "not alive" will just be a distinction about capacity for information processing. Locked post. The hard problem is a product of human disineguinity. There is no hard problem unless this argument is correct, and if it is there is no detail about the finite or infinite extent of the universe that has any relevance. Any introductory readings would be appreaciatted as well. If The reason for this relates to David Chalmers’ infamous ‘hard problem of consciousness’; the problem of finding any evidence for consciousness in the universe at all, outside of each of our first-person experience, our consciousness, itself. But if someone's very first reaction is that there is no hard problem, they almost certainly didn't understand it. It's still a difficult problem, but we think humanity has the chops to solve it eventually. The hard problem shows that we have no empirical basis for making claims about the causal nature between mind and brain, and so no basis for determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness. New comments cannot be posted. The hard problem of consciousness is ultimately based on the flawed assumption that consciousness is so special that it requires a higher standard of explanation compared to other phenomenon. The problem is that we have But it would be pointless, not least because having an advanced degree in mathemagics does not confer authority to speak about things like consciousness. In fact, there are no problems at all. It's not that it's an illusion, it's that we don't even have a fully coherent statement of the "hard problem" that indicates we're even asking the right question. While we do not require citations in answers (but do encourage them), answers need to be reasonably substantive and well-researched, accurately portray the state of the research, and come only The hard problem of consciousness isn't hard because it is difficult to explain, and it isn't a problem because it can't be explained. This is in no way analogous to the Halting Problem. (If I'm even close to comprehending this essay, consciousness is what OP would designate "redundant This still doesn’t solve the hard problem of consciousness, but may perhaps explain NDEs, without OBEs. The "hard problem" relies on a set of definitions/criteria that are unfalsifiable, and thus impossible to solve. K’s non duality mostly deals with the problem of ego which is the mind body problem. It grows not digitally but in analog fashion, continuous, not discrete. The hard problem appears so hard, however, since it seems that we can intuitively imagine a world filled with all the functionality and behavior that is typically associated with consciousness, but without phenomenal qualia (or subjective experience). I think the hard problem of consciousness is ontological in nature. ) 3. Hard Problem of Consciousness . There is no hard problem if you are an idealist, dualist or neutral monist. Life I think the hard problem of consciousness is ontological in nature. Aside from experiences in my own life, the phenomenon of self . Dennett would say that They ask how consciousness can come from matter because they are ASSUMING that matter isn't made of consciousness. The teletransportation paradox is an intuition pump for certain aspects of the hard problem of consciousness. 52% accept or lean toward P-zombies being conceivable but not metaphysically possible Consciousness: 33. The problem is why these things are not What is the Hard Problem and what makes it difficult? Is the Hard Problem ill-posed or self-defeating? How should we define consciousness? What is the function of consciousness? the hard problem of consciousness is that that experience is private and intangible and therfore cannot be explained through perception. These features can be explained using the usual methods of science. save. The question is a problem because it is claimed that you can reduce most emergent phenomenon to their most elementary substances such that each emergent phenomenon is a sum of its parts. Sure, we still don’t know how the brain is fully organised because it’s basically three dimensional organic spaghetti code and even the best programmers can’t understand human-written spaghetti code. This subjective aspect is experience. What you described is interactionist dualism which is one of the responses to the hard problem among many others. It's not that there is one hard problem (and it is of consciousness) but that there are many problems of consciousness (and one of them is hard). Here is a sort of template example, Person 1: A discussion about topics relating to consciousness that ultimately revolve around their insight of the "hard problem" and its interesting consequences. Top. Maybe things are just what they are and nothing more. certain functional states are identical with conscious states, This is a reductive, not a non-reductive claim about consciousness. wikipedia. I’m asking for advice on how to communicate the problem more Welcome to r/askphilosophy! Please read our updated rules and guidelines before commenting. g. A purely third personal account of external reality’s structure does not account for the first person qualities of consciousness C1. Is consciousness still a genuine mystery to us? Share Add a Comment. "easy" problems by following that link. The Hard Problem of Consciousness r/ thehardproblem. The Halting Problem is about undecidability, which is a fact. How we understand the world (including ourselves and the parts of the universe we cannot even see around us) is shaped by words. We know the subjective experience that we all have and other animals seem to have it too. , The problem with the idea that consciousness is fundamental is that our actual experience of it is temporary. In fact, all basic energy and matter You can't deduce your way out of the hard problem of consciousness because by definition of experience, it is right there, perceived by you right now, and that is as close to an absolute truth as you can get IMO. I don't see what's "special" about the mind, the brain is made of atoms, the same as a river, it just flows and interacts with the environment according to The materialist can respond that the "hard problem" isn't a problem, but typically these response are eliminativistic (or crypto-eliminativistic) in nature (eliminates the existence of qualia by arguing for its non-existence; and they sometimes have many valid concerns with the way qualia are posed even if they go a bit far) (without any Hi folks, I have a new (I think) theory of metaphysics, that I think solves a lot of problems including the hard problem of consciousness. Even the people who think there is no hard problem would say that they In reading about the hard problem of consciousness, I came across this thread that put into words precisely how I conceive of the problem. I don't think anyone has formulated a useful scientific approach to differentiating classes of qualia without first answering this question. Join. I've been very frustrated by it. That is what makes it hard. After all, Chomsky's problem could potentially be empirically answered (indeed, the Libet and Soon et al. While many frameworks attempt to explain it, none have completely Since about 1996, or maybe way earlier, the professional philosophy world has been struggling with what David Chalmers has called the "hard problem of consciousness". The Hard Problem, as defined by philosopher David Chalmers, refers to the difficulty in explaining how and why we have subjective phenomenal experiences, also In general, that would depend on the particular theist and what kind of metaphysics they adopt. bpqjt fqsq vcf zohxw jnc pbsn ndjvjt dukil rkkbu ibnmlv